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The Lifeline Banking Controversy:
Putting Deregulation to Work
for the Low-Income Consumert
EDWARD L. RUBIN*
INTRODUCTION
Lifeline banking is a proposal to provide payment services' to low-income
people at a cost below the prevailing market rate. It is motivated by the
view that services such as check cashing and third-party payment are a
necessity of modem life, that "the poor pay more' 2 for these services, and
that they expend a disproportionate amount of their resources on them.
Several states have already enacted lifeline banking statutes of various kinds.'
The issue has also been before Congress on a regular basis, and while none
of the proposed bills has been enacted, there is clearly strong and continued
support for some form of lifeline banking.4
This Article begins from the premise that the motivations for the lifeline
proposal are valid social policy: Resources should be redistributed to low-
income people, and any basic service that is more expensive for them has
an undesirable, counter-redistributive effect. But the efficiency of a payment
system is an important goal as well. Efficiency considerations not only
constrain the extent to which the system can be used for redistributive
purposes, but also determine the effectiveness of redistributive strategies
like lifeline banking.
Part I of this Article describes the lifeline proposals, the controversy that
has surrounded them, and the empirical data that the debate has generated.
Part II analyzes these proposals in economic terms and concludes that
they would waste resources and provide few advantages for the intended
1 © Copyright 1992 by Edward L. Rubin.
* Professor and Associate Dean, University of California, Berkeley School of Law. J.D.
Yale University, 1979. I want to thank my colleague and friend, Robert Cooter, for his help
with this Article.
1. The payment system refers to the mechanisms used to transfer money from one person
to another. At present, the principal mechanisms are cash, checks, credit cards, traveler's
checks, letters of credit, and electronic fund transfers. See E. RutaN & R. CooTER, THE
PAYmENT SYsTm: CAsEs, MTm.rAms AND Issuas (1989); J. VmwAom & V. Smm, CHEcKs,
PAYmENTs, AND ELEcTONic BANKING 6-22 (1986). The discussion in this Article refers primarily
to checking accounts.
2. The phrase comes from one of the seminal works in the consumer movement, D.
CAxz.ovnrz, THE PooR PAY MoRE (1967).
3. See infra note 18.
4. See infra notes 18-20 and 26-28 (citing legislation).
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beneficiaries. Part III advances an alternative proposal: that the financial
services industry be deregulated to allow retail chains such as supermarkets
to offer federally insured deposit accounts and provide payment services.
To subsidize such accounts, this Article recommends further deregulation
to allow these institutions to use the funds received from eligible accounts
for internal corporate purposes without the restrictions that usually accom-
pany the investment of insured deposits. Part IV describes the changes in
the law that would be required to implement these proposals.
I. THE LIFELINE BANKING CONTROVERSY
A. The Evolution of the Lifeline Concept
A lifeline is a rope thrown to someone who is drowning. As might be
expected in our technological age, the first "lifelines" that were proposed
as publicly supported programs consisted not of rope, but of electrons and
petroleum-telephone and heating services for people who could not pay
the existing utility rates, but who clearly needed at least a minimum level
of these services.5
The term was applied to banking services after the partial deregulation
of the industry in 1980.6 Before 1970, only commercial banks were allowed
to offer checking accounts, and these banks were forbidden to pay interest
on the account balance. The prohibition was enacted in the midst of the
Great Depression 7 apparently in an effort to save banks from the temptation
to engage in ruinous competition for deposit funds.8 The result of this
prohibition, as any economist would predict, was that banks engaged in
inefficient competition. Foreclosed from offering consumers interest, they
competed for deposit funds by building excessive numbers of branch banks,
equipping these banks with marble floors and Ionic columns, providing free
5. Canner & Maland, Basic Banking, 73 Fed. Reserve Bull. 255, 256 (1987); see M.
Fernstrom, Consumerism: Implications and Opportunities for Financial Services 17 (American
Express Co., undated) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
6. See infra notes 14-15.
7. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as heavily amended at 12
U.S.C. § 371a (1988)).
8. Banking Act of 1935: Hearings on S. 1715 Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Policy,
Banking, and Deposit Insurance of the Senate Banking and Currency Comm., 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 491 (1935) (remarks of Sen. McAdoo); Consumer Checking Account Equity Act of 1979:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56
(1979) (statement of John G. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter 1979 House
Hearings]; S. AXILROD, THE IMPACT OF THE PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON DEAND DEPosITs 6-15
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1977). Congress may also have believed
that the willingness of money center banks to pay interest on interbank deposits was draining
loanable funds out of rural banks. Id. at 11; Winer, Comment, The Legality of Automatic
Fund Transfer Plans, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 137 (1979).
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services, and offering inducements-such as the proverbial toaster-for
opening new accounts. 9
Through some clever private initiatives, cautious congressional action,
and disingenuous agency regulations, the interest prohibition was gradually
eroded during the 1970s.10 It was finally abolished by the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980," the center-
piece of the Carter administration's deregulatory efforts in the financial
services area. Once banks were permitted to pay market rates of interest
on checking account balances, the end of free toasters and Ionic columns
was at hand. More significantly, banks began to price their payment services
explicitly.' 2 This was certainly a more efficient approach, but it worked to
the disadvantage of low-income customers. Since these customers tended to
have small account balances, they received little interest but were required
to pay increased charges for maintaining the account, stopping payment on
checks, writing insufficient funds checks, and, in some cases, accessing their
accounts through automated teller machines (ATM). 3
This situation soon attracted the attention of consumer advocates. They
were not hostile to deregulation generally-it was consumers, after all, who
were receiving the newly authorized interest payments on their checking
account balances-but they began to believe that low-income consumers
had lost more than they had gained.' 4
9. See NOW Accounts, Federal Reserve Membership and Related Issues: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 316-18 (1977) (statement of Ronald Haselton, President,
Consumers Savings Bank, Worchester, Mass.); id. at 633-34 (statement of Mark Silbergeld,
Director, Washington D.C. Office, Consumers Union); S. AxURoD, supra note 8, at 19-21.
10. For a summary of these events, see 1979 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 57-61
(statement of John G. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency); E. RUnN. & R. COOTER, supra
note 1, at 101-07. The principal instrument which triggered these events was the Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal (NOW) account. See generally Leary, Is the UCC Prepared for the
Thrifts' NOWs, NINOWs and Share Drafts?, 30 CAm. U.L. Rav. 159 (1981); Riordan,
Negotiable Instruments of Withdrawal, 30 Bus. LAW. 151 (1974); Wilson, The "New Checks":
Thrift Institution Check-Like Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Mo. L. Rav.
199 (1980).
11. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-
3524 (1988)). The specific section was § 302(a), 94 Stat. at 145-46 (amending 12 U.S.C. §
371a). See generally T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, FnNciA DEREGULATION AND MONETARY
CONTROL (1982); K. COOPER & D. FRASER, BANxKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COMPETITON
IN FINANCIAL SERvIcEs 105-25 (1984).
12. See Government Check Cashing, "Lifeline" Checking and the Community Reinvestment
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 137-38 (1989) (statement
of Peggy Miller, Legislative Representative, Consumer Federation of America) [hereinafter
1989 Senate Hearings]; Canner & Maland, supra note 5, at 255.
13. See infra note 15.
14. See, e.g., Brobeck, Economic Deregulation and the Least Affluent: Consumer Protec-
tion Strategies, 47 J. Soc. IssUEs 169, 171-77 (1991); Gross, Deregulation: Boon for the
Affluent, Am. Banker, July 2, 1984, at 1; Kutler, The Lifeline Issue: Can the Consumerists
1992]
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Concern soon shifted to the payment services available to low-income
consumers generally.'5 Many low-income consumers were not hurt by de-
regulation because they did not have checking accounts either before or
after 1980. That was hardly an advantage, however. Anyone who was paid
by check, whether from a job or a public welfare agency, needed to cash
that check, and most people also needed to make some noncash payments
to third parties. For those who did not possess checking accounts, the most
common way to obtain payment services was believed to be check-cashing
stores or currency exchanges. 16 These seemed to charge higher rates than
the deregulated banks, thus presenting an even more serious social policy
problem.
Consumer advocates proposed the lifeline account as the solution to the
high cost of bank and nonbank payment services. Banks would be compelled
by statute to offer low-income consumers an account through which they
could carry out a limited number of transactions at below-market rates.'7
By 1984, legislative proposals were being advanced throughout the nation
to implement the lifeline banking concept. At least four states actually
enacted statutes, although all were of fairly limited scope.' s A number of
Stop the Deregulators?, Am. Banker, Mar. 13, 1985, at 4; Nader, Deregulation Has Potential
for Consumer Confusion, Abuse, Am. Banker, July 12, 1983, at 6; Public Advocates, Inc.,
Petty Larceny: Excessive Bank Charges Produce Crisis for the Poor (Aug. 7, 1984) (unpublished
administrative petition on file with the Indiana Law Journal) [hereinafter Petty Larceny].
15. See Comprehensive Reform in the Financial Services Industry: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-156 (1985)
(statement of Stephen Brobeck, Executive Director, Consumer Federation of America) [here-
inafter 1985 Senate Hearings].
16. Riemer, Liberty, Justice and Bank Accounts for All?, Bus. WK., July 1, 1985, at 68;
Petty Larceny, supra note 14, at 33-35.
17. A coalition of consumer groups in California, for example, proposed that people with
yearly incomes of $11,000 or less (in 1984) be offered accounts with no monthly service charge
for the first ten checks and insufficient funds charges of no more than $5 per item. It also
proposed that banks cash government checks for free, regardless of whether the payee had an
account at the bank, and that the cost of money orders be regulated by law. Petty Larceny,
supra note 14, at 38-39; Riemer, supra note 16, at 39. The members of the coalition were
Consumer Action, Self-Help for the Elderly, Black Women Organized for Political Action,
Gray Panthers, Oakland Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal, League of United Latin
American Citizens, Sacramento Urban League, Progressive Senior Citizens, and the National
Organization for Women (San Francisco Chapter).
18. Massachusetts requires its state-chartered banks to provide savings and checking ac-
counts without service charges to customers over 65 or under 18. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 167D,
§ 2 (Law. Co-op. 1987). Illinois requires banks to offer accounts with 10 free checks and a
maximum initial deposit of $100 for customers over 65. IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 504 (Smith-
Hurd 1981 & Supp. 1991). Minnesota and Pennsylvania require lifeline banking services as
quid pro quo for permission to engage in interstate banking. Minnesota specifies that customers
with annual family incomes below the federal poverty income guidelines or who receive public
assistance must be offered an account with no initial or periodic fees, six free checks, and six
free ATM transactions per month. Reciprocal Interstate Banking Act, MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§
46.044, 48.512 (West 1988). Pennsylvania leaves the details to the state banking department.
Act of June 25, 1986, 1986 Pa. Laws 259 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 116(i)-(k)
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other states considered lifeline statutes but did not enact them.' 9 In addition,
various bills with lifeline features were introduced in Congress. 20 Even the
Federal Reserve joined the effort, issuing a joint policy statement with other
regulators that encouraged banks to provide "basic banking services" at
lower rates.2 1
The furor over lifeline banking dampened somewhat in the latter half of
the 1980s. Consumer advocates in the financial services area directed their
energies largely toward the issue of funds availability, where they achieved
notable success with the passage of the Expedited Funds Availability Act
of 1987.2 Whether from fear of the Federal Reserve, from a desire to
forestall the demand for lifeline legislation, or from a sense of business
opportunities, banks began to offer low-cost checking accounts. 23 These
accounts-which banks preferred to call "basic" rather than "lifeline" 24-
were often designed along the lines of the legislation that had been enacted
in other jurisdictions. 25
Although lifeline banking no longer possesses the shock effect that it did
when first proposed, it remains a major public policy issue in the financial
services area. Senator Howard Metzenbaum has introduced a series of lifeline
bills over the last few years, and they have received serious consideration
(Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1991)). Massachusetts and Connecticut have enacted laws requiring
banks to cash government checks for nondepositors. 1987 Conn. Acts 24, (Reg. Sess.) (codified
at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-9bb to -9cc (West 1987 & Supp. 1991)).
19. See, e.g., Sudo, Connecticut Banks Mull Voluntary Low-Cost Lifeline Checking Ac-
counts, Am. Banker, Dec. 11, 1985, at 2, 23.
20. H.R. 2661, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Rc. 14,058 (1985); H.R. 2011, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 131 CONG. REc. 7611 (1985). The 1985 House bill, for example, was a
comprehensive consumer banking bill introduced by Representative Charles Schumer. Title II,
"Consumer Access to Depository Institutions," required every federally insured depository
institution to offer a basic account with no minimum balance, no fee for the first eight checks
and the first five other withdrawals each month, and specified limits on other charges. H.R.
2661, supra.
21. See 47 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 403-04 (Sept. 15, 1986); Canner & Maland, supra note
5, at 266; Easton, Fed Moves to Encourage Banks to Provide Low-Cost Services, Am. Banker,
Sept. 11, 1986, at 1.
22. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (West 1988)).
For a general discussion of this legislation, see R. BRAu, Tn EXPEDITED FuNms AvALABrrY
MAuAL (1989); C6oter & Rubin, Orders and Incentives as Regulatory Methods: The Expedited
Funds Availability Act of 1987, 35 UCLA L. Rnv. 1115, 1140-50 (1988).
23. See Brenner, New York Scores Itself High on "Basics," Am. Banker, Mar. 2, 1989,
at 6; Canner & Maland, supra note 5, at 265-66; Sudo, supra note 19; Weinstein, Maine
Banks OfferAnnual-Fee Checking, Am. Banker, Dec. 17, 1987, at 1; A. Fox & K. McEldowney,
Bank Fees on Consumer Accounts: The Fourth Annual National Survey 3-4 (Consumer
Federation of America, undated) (unpublished survey; copy on file with the Indiana Law
Journal); K. Peyton, Banking for the Masses: Are Basic Bank Accounts the Answer? (1988)
(unpublished masters thesis; copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
24. See Canner & Maland, supra note 5, at 256.
25. See supra note 18.
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in both houses of Congress. 26 The current version consists of two separate
bills. One requires a bank to cash government checks of $1500 or less at
cost even when the payee does not have an account at that bank.27 The
second requires the bank to offer checking services at cost to people who
have account balances under $1000. 28 Neither has been enacted, but the
idea behind them remains very much alive.
B. The Empirical Basis of the Lifeline Proposal
The consumer advocates and bank representatives who lined up on
opposite sides of the lifeline services debate possessed not only different
personal affiliations and material interests, but also different images of the
world. Consumer advocates believed that banks were driving away indigent,
and even middle-class, customers and were directing their energies to the
most affluent segments of the population.29 The consumer advocates also
held the not entirely consistent belief that banks were making excessive
profits at the expense of ordinary consumers by charging high fees on
transaction accounts. 0 The banks saw themselves as beleaguered by demands
to subsidize indigent consumers at the expense of their other customers,
26. See, e.g., H.R. 3181, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 3180, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); S. 907, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 906, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 5094,
100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988). Senator Metzenbaum has also introduced, or attempted to
introduce, lifeline banking provisions as amendments to comprehensive financial reform bills
on a number of occasions. 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1060-61 (May 8, 1989).
27. Government Check Cashing Act of 1991, S. 414, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The
bill would allow banks to require nondepositors who want to cash checks to register and
obtain some form of identification document. While this may seem like a reasonable precaution
against fraud, the registration provisions are fairly complex and may act as a disincentive to
low-income customers.
28. Basic Banking Services Act of 1991, S. 415, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Additional
requirements are that the opening balance be no less than $25 and that the minimum balance
be no less than $I.
29. See 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 132 (statement of Robert J. Sell, Member,
National Legislative Council, American Association of Retired Persons); Consumer Access to
Basic Financial Services, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs & Coinage of
the House Comm. on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1989)
(statement of Mary Ann Cunningham, Chairperson, Banking Committee, Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now) [hereinafter 1989 House Hearings]; id. at 34
(statement of Jean Ann Fox, President, Virginia Citizens Consumer Council); Gross, supra
note 14; Petty Larceny, supra note 14, at 24-35.
30. See 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 44 (statement of Rosemary Dunlap,
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council); id. at 137 (statement of Peggy Miller, Legislative
Representative, Consumer Federation of America, Washington, D.C.); Brobeck, supra note
14, at 174-76; Petty Larceny, supra note 14, at 10-28. The two claims can be reconciled by
concluding that some poor and middle-class customers are leaving the banking system, while
those who remain are being victimized by excessively high charges. How this would occur in
a competitive environment is discussed below.
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their shareholders, their borrowers, and the free enterprise system." They
also believed that anyone who wanted a checking account could readily
obtain one at affordable rates . 2
While some of these beliefs were purely interpretive, others were based
on empirically verifiable factual assertions. During the course of the lifeline
debate, a rather respectable level of empirical research was carried out; it
was not determinative, but it was quite creditable. The basic demographic
facts that underlie the call for lifeline banking can be found in the extensive
surveys of consumer financial services conducted by the Federal Reserve
Board 'in 1977 and 1983.11 According to the surveys, 66% of the families
in the lowest income decile did not possess a checking account. For the
next lowest decile, the figure was 42%; for the two middle deciles, it was
20% and 13%; and for the two highest deciles, it was 5% and 30o.
Moreover, families headed by nonwhites were disproportionately represented
among those without checking accounts, and families headed by nonwhite
women were even more disproportionately represented. Families headed by
nonwhites constituted about 30% of all families with incomes under $10,000,
but nearly 57% of such families had neither a savings nor a checking
account. Families headed by nonwhite women comprised 17% of all families
with incomes under $10,000 but 340o of those without accounts. Among
all families, those headed by nonwhites totalled 19% and those headed by
nonwhite women totalled 7%, but 500o of the families that did not have
any deposit account were headed by nonwhites and 27% were headed by
nonwhite women.14
Reacting to statistics such as these, the American Bankers Association
(ABA) commissioned a survey by the Unidex Corporation to determine the
reasons why people do not possess checking accounts." The survey consisted
of 527 telephone interviews with families who had no checking account and
31. See 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 125 (statement of John Kelly, Jr., President,
National Bankers Association); id. at 94-97 (statement of Robert Stevens, President, Bryn
Mawr Trust Co.); 1989 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 59 (statement of Robert Stevens,
President, Bryn Mawr Trust Co.); Kutler, supra note 14.
32. See 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 106 (statement of Richard Loundy,
Chairman of the Board, Devon Bank, Chicago, Ill.); id. at 95-96 (statement of Robert Stevens,
President, Bryn Mawr Trust Co.); 1989 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 60-62 (statement
of Victor Bennett, Chairman, Bank Operations Committee, Independent Bankers Association
of America); AMERICAN BANKERS AssOCIAToN, ANAYSIS OF UNmEX SURVEY OF Low INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS WrmoTrr CHECKING AccouNTs (Mar. 7, 1985) [hereinafter AMERICAN BANKERS
ASSOCIATON] (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal), reprinted in part in E. RUBIN &
R. COOTER, supra note 1, at 148-50.
33. T. DURKIN & G. ELLEHAUSEN, 1977 CONSUMER CREDrr SURVEY (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 1977); Avery, Elliehausen & Canner, Survey of Consumer
Finances 1983, 70 Fed. Reserve Bull. 679 (1984).
34. These conclusions are conveniently summarized in Canner & Maland, supra note 5, at
261-62.
35. AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 32.
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whose income was below $20,000. In response to a question about why
they had chosen not to have a checking account, 21.6% of the respondents
said they did not need it, 28.7% said they did not want it, and 43.8% said
they could not afford it. When the last group was probed, 86.8% said they
did not have enough money to make the account worthwhile, while only
10.8% repeated that they could not afford it. Only 2.4% specified that they
could not afford the service charges. 3 6 From this, the ABA concluded that
only 3% of the respondents had decided to close or forgo a checking
account because of service charges. 37
A few months after the ABA/Unidex survey, Consumer Action conducted
its own survey, interviewing 615 people at unemployment offices, check-
cashing outlets, senior housing facilities, social service agencies, and college
campuses.3" Of the 64% who did not have a checking account, 53% said
the reason was that the account was too costly, 15% said the banks were
inconvenient, and 10% said they distrusted banks. Fully 69% of those
interviewed said that they would be interested in a lifeline-type account-
no minimum balance, a $25 initial deposit, and a maximum fee of $1 per
month for up to 12 checks.3 9
Clearly, these studies point toward different explanations for the acknowl-
edged fact that disproportionate numbers of low-income people do not have
checking accounts. Neither of these studies, however, inspires much confi-
dence. Asking a few hundred consumers in face-to-face or telephone inter-
views to give a succinct explanation for complex behavior is a fairly primitive
research technique, particularly when both sets of interviewers were well
aware of the kinds of answers they desired. Unfortunately, more sophisti-
cated, neutral studies were never carried out, so the existing information,
while certainly better than nothing, cannot be regarded as definitive. 40
Another way to assess the behavior of low-income customers is to
investigate the payment systems that they use in place of checks. The most
common one, as the Federal Reserve study indicates, is cash. 4' Whether the
36. Id. at 1-2. Those who had once had, but closed, a checking account gave a similar set
of reasons.
37. See id. at 1. In addition, the ABA pointed out that 89.8% of the respondents said
they rarely had difficulty cashing checks. Id. at 2.
38. CONSUMER ACTION, CONSUMER BANKING SERVICE (1985) (copy on file at the Indiana
Law Journal), reprinted in part in E. RUBIN & R. COOTER, supra note 1, at 150-51.
39. Id.
40. The Federal Reserve commissioned a follow-up study by the Survey Research Center
in 1986. Only 67 families without accounts were interviewed. The Center, even though it is
located at the University of Michigan, used similarly unsophisticated techniques. The data
from this study tended to support the Unidex survey; 63% of the families reported that they
did not have a bank account because they would not use it enough to make the account
worthwhile, while none cited high service charges as the reason. Canner & Maland, supra note
5, at 263-64.
41. See Avery, Elliehausen, Kennickell & Spindt, The Use of Cash and Transaction Accounts
by American Families, 72 Fed. Reserve Bull. 87, 89-100 (1986).
[Vol. 67:213
LIFELINE BANKING
use of cash entails greater costs for the consumer than a checking account
is a complex, subtle question.42 There are many low-income consumers,
however, who cannot rely entirely on cash because they receive part or all
of their income in the form of checks: paychecks, welfare checks, social
security checks, and others. Lacking a transaction account, they need to
cash these checks. This leads to a subsidiary set of empirical questions:
Where do these consumers cash their checks, and how much do they pay
for this service?
There seem to be two major types of institutions that will cash checks:
banks and check-cashing outlets or currency exchanges. Whether banks
ordinarily cash checks for people without accounts at the bank is a matter
of debate. The Unidex survey reported that 48.8% of its interviewees, none
of whom had checking accounts, cashed their checks at a bank, savings
and loan, or credit union. Moreover, 65.6% of those surveyed said they
did not have to pay a fee in order to cash checks. 43 A survey of bank fees
conducted by San Francisco Consumer Action and the Consumer Federation
of America reported that only 29% of the financial institutions surveyed
would cash a government check-the least risky kind-for a nondepositor
at any price. Of those that would, less than half would do so free of charge;
the others charged a fee averaging $3.74 on a $300 check, or somewhat
above 1%." In 1988, the- General Accounting Office (GAO) published an
extensive nationwide survey of banking institutions. It found that, as of
1985, 86% of banks and 55% of thrift institutions cashed United States
Treasury checks for nondepositors. Of these, 56% of the banks and 84%
of the thrifts did so for free. The median fee at the other institutions was
about $2. 41
These disparities in the data are not encouraging, although they may be
partially explained by disparities in the sample or the types of checks
involved. The Consumer Federation study, for example, focused on urban
neighborhoods, and the GAO agreed that people in such neighborhoods
experience greater difficulty cashing checks than the population at large. 46
42. A consumer who is paid in cash and pays all his obligations in cash would never need
to use another payment instrument. While he would incur no direct charges for his payment
activities, he might be subject to a variety of indirect but real expenses. Making payments in
cash might require hand delivery, which takes time and incurs transportation costs. Carrying
and keeping cash creates a greater risk of theft, loss, and damage than using checks. The
magnitude of these indirect costs will vary from one consumer to another, and they are
extremely difficult to quantify.
43. AMERICAN BANKEaS ASSOCIATION, supra note 32.
44. A. Fox & K. McEldowney, supra note 23, at 5-6.
45. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFICE, GOVERNMENT CHECK-CASHING ISSUES 13
(1988). reprinted in 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 383.
46. Id. at 14. Another possibility is that the banks' willingness to cash checks for
nondepositors is highly discretionary. A bank that is prepared to cash a government check for
nondepositors as a matter of general policy may not do so if the nondepositor is wearing a 2
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Consumer Federation of America conducted a study of the fees charged
by currency exchanges. For cashing a Social Security check, an Aid to
Families with Dependent Children check, or a payroll check issued by a
major national corporation, the median charge in 1987 was 1.5% of the
face amount and the mean was about 1.7%. 47 The lowest charges, 0.77%
to 0.78% of the face value, occurred in the State of New York, where the
fees are regulated by state law; the highest were 5% .48 Half the currency
exchanges used the same fee scale for cashing personal checks; the other
half charged more. The mean for all institutions was 4.5% . 49 The study
was updated in 1989, and the results were generally consistent with the
prior study, except for a sharp increase in the percentage charges for cashing
personal checks. 50
Another set of studies by Consumer Federation focused on bank fees. 5'
The general finding was that customers who use currency exchanges will
usually pay more than those who have bank accounts. In 1987, a typical
customer, who cashed fifty $320 payroll checks a year at currency exchanges
and bought six money orders each month, could pay from $173.68 to $518
per year for payment services, the average being $301.44. 52 By contrast, the
average annual fee for noninterest checking was $46.80, assuming no bounced
checks. 3 If the customer bounced four checks a year, the average cost
increased to $100.14 Similarly, a study by Kathryn Peyton of payment
services in two low-income San Francisco neighborhoods concluded that an
Live Crew jacket. When that bank reports to a government agency, providing information for
use in considering lifeline legislation, it is likely to state its policy, not its practice. Cf. 1989
House Hearings, supra note 29, at 28-29 (statement of Peggy Miller, Legislative Representative,
Consumer Federation of America) (regarding bank claims that they offer lifeline accounts).
47. T. Ciaglo & A. Fox, National Survey of Check Cashing Outlets 2-3 (Consumer
Federation of America, Dec., 1987) (unpublished survey; copy on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 2-3.
50. P. Miller & D. Lever, Check Cashing Outlet Fees Still High and Climbing 3-4 (Consumer
Federation of America, Dec., 1989) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal). In the
updated study, the mean charge for government or payroll checks was about 1.7% of the face
value. Id. at 2-3. The mean charge for cashing personal checks had increased from 4.5%o to
7.7%. Id. at 3-4. However, the percentage of check cashing outlets willing to cash personal
checks increased from 19% to 31%. Id. at 3. It is possible, therefore, that the increase in the
mean charge resulted from the entry of new firms into this market and reflected these firms'
higher estimate of the risk involved in offering the service. This is supported by the fact that
the low end of the range of charges remained essentially unchanged between 1987 and 1989
(1.6% to 1.66%), but the high end jumped from 12% to 20%. Id. at 4.
51. A. Fox & K. McEldowney, supra note 23, at I.
52. T. Ciaglo & A. Fox, supra note 47, at 4.
53. A. Fox & K. McEldowney, supra note 23, Table 1. The figure, computed on a monthly
basis, is $3.90 per month or 23¢ per check. Each $320 payroll check would cost $5.44 to cash
at the mean 1987 rate. Id.
54. Id. Table 4.
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average consumer would pay from $3.50 to $10 per month for a checking
account but $12 to $31.05 if she relied on currency exchanges. 55
These studies are more reliable than the interview inquiries into consumer
behavior, since they are based on observable facts. None of them are truly
comprehensive, however, since their samples were limited; the Consumer
Federation study surveyed only sixty currency exchanges. More importantly,
the data that these studies provide must be interpreted before reliable
conclusions can be drawn from them. The most basic limitation of empirical
research, however, is that it only answers the questions that are asked. In
the lifeline services debate, those questions have revolved around the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of a single policy device: compelling banks to
offer checking accounts at below-market rates. The real questions are
whether this device can achieve its goal under any empirical conditions and
whether there are other mechanisms that would do so more effectively.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE Ln EINE PROPOSAL
The term "lifeline" is a public relations masterstroke, but bankers are
probably correct in asserting that it overdramatizes the problem. No one's
life is in danger as a result of high bank charges; the issue, rather, is
whether some people are paying more than they need to, or more than they
should, for payment services. That is a matter that can be analyzed through
economic analysis of law.
5 6
From the economic perspective, the goal of those who favor lifeline
services is openly redistributive. In their view, low-income people should
receive certain payment services at below-market rates as a matter of social
equity. The argument is not based on any claim that payment services are
inefficiently priced. Quite the contrary, it is the efficient pricing of these
services that is the source of the problem. By eliminating the price caps on
transaction account interest, thereby eliminating the cross subsidy in favor
of these accounts, deregulation has exposed low-income consumers to the
full rigors of an efficient market. Proponents of lifeline banking favor a
55. K. Peyton, supra note 23, at 42-43.
56. Many readers of law and economics literature might conclude that economic analysis
would be unalterably hostile to the lifeline concept. But this confuses the methodology of legal
economics with the goal of economic efficiency. The methodology can be used in the service
of any goal within the economic realm. It may produce more defimitive results when efficiency
is chosen as the goal, but this is a limitation of the discipline, not a normative argument
governing its use. Moreover, considerations of efficiency are never entirely absent even if
efficiency is not the primary objective. We almost always want to achieve the objective we
have chosen in an efficient manner. An artist painting a picture is motivated primarily by the
desire to create beauty, but she would generally want to do so efficiently; that is, she would
want to minimize her expenses for paints, studio space, and so forth. An efficiency-based




new subsidy for these people to counteract the effects of these deregulatory
developments. The rationale is analogous to the argument for providing
food stamps, which are not designed to remedy an inefficiency in the market
but to provide low-income people with a subsidy so that they can buy more
food.17
Despite its redistributive goal, as opposed to an efficiency goal, the
argument for lifeline services can be legitimately analyzed in economic
terms. The crucial issues are the extent to which low-income people would
benefit from being offered checking accounts at below-market rates and
whether these benefits could be achieved more efficiently-that is, at lower
cost-by other means. To answer these questions, we need to know whether
people without checking accounts are paying more for payment services
than the market rate, and thus (presumably) paying more than those who
use these accounts. If they are not, offering them below-market accounts
is a pure subsidy, an in-kind grant to an identified group. In contrast, if
people without checking accounts are paying more, providing low-cost
accounts might be a way of equalizing the position of those people. It
would still be a wealth transfer, but its purpose would be to correct an
inequality in the pricing system.
Despite the empirical work performed to date, one cannot be certain
whether checking accounts are more or less expensive than alternate payment
systems. In the face of such empirical uncertainty, the best course is to
analyze both possibilities. This provides a way of assessing each element of
the problem and might even generate an answer that would be preferable
in either situation.
A. Lifeline Banking as Redistribution
We can begin with the possibility that people without checking accounts
are not paying more for payment services. In that case, offering below-
market services would nevertheless benefit those eligible because it would
enable them to obtain payment services more cheaply. It would represent a
wealth transfer, whereby resources are transferred from some other sector
of society to those with lower incomes. Lifeline banking would certainly
have this effect upon people who already possess checking accounts but
who were eligible to shift their account to lifeline status.
In-kind wealth transfers have been severely criticized in public finance
theory, and all those criticisms are applicable-some with increased force-
to lifeline banking. To begin with, in-kind transfers are less efficient than
57. See generally K. CARusoN, FooD STAn's An NrmuTmoN (1975); M. MAcDONALD,
FooD, STAmpS, AND INcomE MAINTENANCE (1977); Giertz & Sullivan, The Role of Food Stamps
in Welfare Reform, in WELFARE RrFou IN AMERICA 101 (P. Sommers ed. 1982). All sources
cited discuss the substitution effect in the context of the food stamps program.
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cash grants because they produce what economists refer to as a substitution
effect s A decline in the price of a product will induce people to purchase
more of that product, to substitute that product for others. In-kind grants
are equivalent to a price decrease for people receiving the benefit. The
recipients will consume more of the subsidized product than they would if
they had received a cash grant of the same magnitude.5 9 That is inefficient
because the recipients could be placed in an equally good position-from
their own point of view-at a lower cost to society. They could be given a
cash subsidy equal to the value of the in-kind subsidy minus the magnitude
of substitution effectA0
The usual justification for in-kind wealth transfers is paternalism. Poor
people are provided with food stamps to ensure that they spend the funds
they receive on food rather than other less beneficial items, such as liquor.6'
Many regard paternalistic policies of this sort as offensive because of their
underlying assumptions about the behavior of low-income people.62 But
even if we can justify in-kind grants of food and medical care on these
grounds, we cannot justify in-kind grants of payment services. One might
believe that the poor spend their paychecks or welfare checks on the wrong
items, but no one believes that they stubbornly refuse to cash these checks.
One might believe that they leave bills unpaid so that they can purchase
less necessary items, but no one believes that they do so because of the
cost of checks or money orders. There are no fathers hanging out at the
currency exchange, indulging in the evil pleasures of high-cost payment
services while their wives and children are left at home, crying for lack of
a checking account. No matter what one's opinion of low-income people,
paternalism is unpersuasive as a source of policy for the payment system.
A second difficulty with using below-market bank accounts as a wealth
transfer mechanism involves the administrative cost of operating the pro-
gram.63 Some government agency must determine eligibility criteria and then
provide the means of identifying those in the eligible category. To some
extent, the magnitude of these costs depends on whether the program is
categorical or broad based, that is, whether the eligibility criteria are specific
58. See, e.g., J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHIuTicAL.
APPROACH (3d ed. 1980); E. MANSFnD, MICROEcoNomcs: THEORY AND PRACTICE 84-87 (3d
ed. 1979).
59. See, e.g., J. STIGLr=z, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 206-08 (1986).
60. See, e.g., id. at 291-94.
61. See id. at 296-97; R. MusGRAvE & P. MusORAWE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 102-03 (3d ed. 1980).
62. Another view is that in-kind benefit programs are offensive because they are an
instrument for social control of the recipients. See, e.g., F. PrvEN & R. CLowAD, REGULATING
THE POOR (1971).
63. See J. STatrrz, supra note 59, at 297.
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or general. 64 Specific or categorical programs are theoretically more efficient
because they direct the benefit to those who truly need it, but they are
more expensive to administer because they require more frequent and
elaborate determinations. For example, the Massachusetts lifeline law applies
to any person over sixty-five or under eighteen. 65 This scheme is relatively
easy to administer, but its blunderbuss approach is at once over- and
underinclusive; there are obviously people over sixty-five who have no need
for subsidized payment services and people under sixty-five who need them
very much. On the other hand, a more discriminating needs-based test would
involve formidable-and expensive-administrative complexities. 6
Finally, the use of below-cost checking accounts to transfer wealth is
problematic because it involves a specific tax, rather than a lump sum tax.
In effect, the banks required to provide checking accounts at lower rates
are paying a tax equal to the rate differential. There is a broad consensus
that taxes of this sort are inefficient because they distort the behavior of
those subject to the tax in unintended ways. 67 A bridge toll motivates people
to drive by circuitous routes; a tax on bricks discourages home construction
or induces people to use more lumber. The difficulties with taxing banks
by obligating them to offer below-market rates are evident. It would create
an incentive for banks to close branches in areas where recipients of the
benefit live or to discourage these recipients from opening accounts.
In summary, lifeline accounts are an inefficient and thus undesirable way
of transferring wealth to the disadvantaged. If society wants to transfer
more wealth to them, it should give them money raised from general taxes.
If the poor do not pay more for banking services, there is no reason to
provide them with below-market accounts.
B. Lifeline Banking as Equalization
The previous argument, however, does not conclude the inquiry. While
the empirical evidence is incomplete, the available data suggest that low-
income people do in fact pay more for banking services. Cashing checks at
64. See R. MusGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 61, at 554-58; J. STiLrrz, supra note
59, at 297-300.
65. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167D, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
66. This same point could be made, and has been made, about any redistributive program.
But these costs must be incurred anew each time a program is created. Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) involves significant administrative costs, but those costs are fixed;
to increase the amount of aid would involve relatively trivial cost increases. If one wants to
transfer wealth to low-income people, one can do so more efficiently by augmenting an existing
program, such as AFDC, than by creating a new one.
67. See J. DuE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GovERNMENT FINANCE: ECONOanCS OF THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 200-04 (6th ed. 1977); A. HARBERGER, TAXATION AND WELFARE (1974); R. MUSGRAVE
& P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 61, at 303-24; Break, The Incidence and Economic Effect of
Taxation, in THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 122 (1974).
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currency exchanges and buying money orders are probably more expensive
than using a transaction account offered by a bank. 68 The ABA's Unidex
Survey does not refute this observation; at most, it indicates that lower
income consumers prefer using other means of payment.69 In summarizing
the implications of the Unidex Survey, the ABA attached great significance
to the fact that most low-income consumers did not mention price as a
reason for their lack of a checking account. This only confirms that checking
accounts are probably cheaper than the alternatives. It does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the ABA would like to draw, which is that
further lowering the price of checking accounts would be of no use to these
consumers. To determine the validity of that proposition, one needs a better
understanding of the reason why low-income consumers are probably willing
to use higher cost methods of payment.
There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon, the first re-
sulting from rational behavior and the second-much disfavored by econ-
omists-resulting from behavior that is more emotional, though not necessarily
irrational. The rational explanation is that alternative payment mechanisms,
while higher in price, provide other advantages that compensate for the
price differential. Most obviously, these alternative mechanisms are more
convenient than banks. Currency exchanges, for example, are open much
longer hours, even allowing for the extended hours that banks now offer.70
According to the Peyton study, one check-cashing store in San Francisco
was open from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday and from
9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. 71 The advantages of these extended hours
for working people are apparent. In addition, the currency exchanges are
usually small storefront operations, more numerous and more conveniently
located than banks.72 Money orders are often available at stores such as
supermarkets and drugstores, which are open longer hours and are more
conveniently located than branch banks.73 A rational consumer may well be
willing to pay more for payment services in order to obtain these advantages.
A second possibility is that low-income consumers use alternative, higher-
cost payment mechanisms for emotional reasons. They may find a bank's
stern glass and concrete architecture as intimidating as the Ionic columns
68. See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
69. AmE~iac BANcans AssocutlION, supra note 32.
70. 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 55-56 (statement of Jerome S. Gagerman,
President, National Check Cashing Association); id. at 149 (remarks of Sen. Dixon); see 1989
House Hearings, supra note 29, at 78 (remarks of Howard B. Brown, Connecticut Banking
Commissioner).
71. K. Peyton, supra note 23, at 36.
72. See sources cited supra note 70.
73. See T. Ciaglo & A. Fox, supra note 47, at 3 (Of the 60 currency exchanges surveyed
in Consumer Federation of America National Survey of Check Cashing Outlets, 55 sold money
orders.); K. Peyton, supra note 23, at 36-37, 40-41.
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and imitation marble of the prior era. They may feel unwelcome if a bank
has long lines, harried tellers, and snooty officers. They may be suspicious
of bank practices, or they may not understand how transaction accounts
work.7 4 There is a certain amount of evidence to support these suppositions.
In the Unidex study, some twelve percent of the people who closed their
checking accounts reported that they had trouble keeping their account
records balanced, and a small number reported that they did not trust
banks.75 A study of Hispanic consumers revealed that only one-third had
checking accounts, possibly because they felt unwelcome in banks or because
they did not trust them.76
Whichever of these explanations is correct, requiring banks to provide
below-market rate accounts would not solve the inequality problem. If many
low-income consumers are choosing higher-cost payment alternatives because
of their convenience or their noneconomic appeal, lowering the cost of
checking accounts still further is unlikely to alter these established behaviors
to ahy significant extent. Of course, lowered costs would probably have
some effect; one can confidently predict that if the cost of a service is
lowered, more people will use that service. But the elasticity of demand is
probably quite low, since the consumers involved are not price sensitive in
the first place. Given the complexity of prices for banking services, more-
over, even significant changes in checking account charges would probably
not be communicated to low-income consumers without aggressive market-
ing, and aggressive marketing will not be forthcoming from institutions that
are being compelled to offer the accounts at a loss.
In short, the difference between banks and alternative payment providers,
in terms of both convenience and emotional effect, is large and qualitative,
probably too large for a moderate price change to affect. In order to
produce a real increase in demand, it might be necessary to decrease the
price to zero, or below zero; that is, to pay people for opening a bank
account. This seems inefficient because the social resources needed to
subsidize bank accounts so heavily would far exceed the benefit derived
from inducing people to acquire them. By choosing a social mechanism that
does not address the real problem, one must use a very large amount of
bait to catch a very small redistributive fish.
But this only states part of the problem with the idea of lifeline banking.
As previously noted, requiring banks to provide below-market checking
accounts constitutes a special tax on them; all taxes of this sort exercise
74. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OMCE, supra note 45, at 25-27; AmRCAN
BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 32. All these reactions, if true, would seem to stem from
the same source: a lack of familiarity with banks.
75. AidMwcA BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 32, at Q4.
76. Alaniz & Gilly, The Hispanic Family-Consumer Research Issues, 3 PSYCHOLOGY &
MARKETING 291, 301 (1986).
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distorting effects upon behavior." In this case, the effect would entirely
undermine the program; it would lead banks to act in ways that decrease
the number of low-income people who use checking accounts. Forced to
offer accounts at lower rates, banks would cut back on services, either to
restore their profit margin or to discourage people from making use of
such accounts. Lines would get longer, tellers more harried, and bank
officers more snooty. Banks might choose to close branches in low-income
communities to avoid having to offer lifeline accounts. This would amplify
the very reasons why low-income people presently do not use bank accounts;
it would make banks less convenient and less inviting. One could hardly
expect banks to provide more services, or welcome customers with more
enthusiasm, when they would lose money on them.
This situation would be the converse of the one that prevailed before
1980. At that time, banks were forbidden to pay interest on deposit accounts,
which meant, in essence, that they were compelled to charge higher prices
for these accounts than they would have otherwise. They responded by
offering additional services to attract accounts; they opened new branches,
hired additional tellers, advertised heavily, and offered free gifts to new
customers. 78 If banks were required to charge lower prices than they oth-
erwise would, they would provide fewer services. In all probability, no bank
would require customers to give it a toaster before allowing them to open
an account, but many would provide fewer branches, fewer tellers, and less
aggressive marketing.
The fact that lifeline banking does not seem to solve the problem of
high-cost payments does not mean that no problem exists. One could only
reach this conclusion by giving normative significance to the market's factual
conditions. It may be true that banks are already the lowest-cost providers
of payment services and that those who do not open checking accounts do
so for economic or emotional reasons that would not be affected by still
lower prices at the bank. Nonetheless, the poor pay more, 9 and this creates
a social problem. Inequalities of wealth are themselves problematic, although
most people in our society regard them as inevitable. But there would seem
to be no need to add inequalities in the price of services to the inequalities
that are necessarily a part of our system. Clearly, it is undesirable for low-
income consumers to pay more for a given service, thus spending a dispro-
portionately large share of their lesser means for that purpose. While the
call for lifeline services may not be an appropriate response, it has at least
directed our attention to a real problem.
77. See supra text accompanying note 67.
78. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 2.
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III. DEREGULATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
The basic difficulty with the lifeline banking proposal is that it constitutes
a reflexive response to the problem it addresses. Low-income people seem
to pay more than others for payment services; lifeline banking would compel
banks to charge them less. This represents a rather direct effort to achieve
social equity, but it ignores basic principles of economics. Regulating the
price of banking services is generally inefficient; it distorts incentives and
fails to address the convenience or emotional concerns that seem to motivate
low-income consumers. An alternative approach is to use economic analysis
to generate an efficient solution to the problem. The goal would continue
to be social equity, but the aspiration would be to achieve that goal in an
economically efficient manner.
If payment services for low-income consumers are priced undesirably
high, the natural economic explanation is a lack of competition. Bank
accounts may be relatively inexpensive, but they cannot compete directly
with currency exchanges; they are either too inconvenient, too intimidating,
or, most likely, a combination of the two. The efficient solution, therefore,
would be to identify some other source of competition for both types of
institutions. Whether that would lead to lower prices depends on the reason
why banks and currency exchanges currently charge the prices that they do.
This inquiry relies, in turn, on empirical evidence that is not fully available,
but the idea seems sufficiently promising to merit further inquiry.
A. Retailers as Providers of Payment Services
The most obvious sources of competition for banks and currency ex-
changes are retail chains, such as supermarkets. 0 They already serve as an
alternative provider of payment services in many cases; supermarkets are
often willing to cash their customers' paychecks, usually by accepting the
check as payment for groceries and returning the difference in cash.,' A
supermarket could serve as the location for the delivery of payment services
in two ways: it could provide a location for a branch of an existing bank,
80. See 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 149 (remarks of Richard Loundy, Chairman
of the Board, Devon Bank, Chicago, Ill.); UNITED STATEs GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 45, at 398. Drug stores, appliance or hard goods stores, and video rental stores
would also be likely possibilities. Another possible payment provider would be post offices,
which currently sell money orders. In Europe and Japan, post offices play a major role in
providing financial services to consumers. However, supermarkets are probably the most
promising possibility and will be the focus of the discussion here.
81. Available empirical studies confirm the existence of this practice, although they differ
as to its extent. 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 149 (remarks of Richard Loundy,
Chairman of the Board, Devon Bank, Chicago, ILL.); UNITED STATES GENERAL AccoUNTING
OFFcE, supra note 45, at 398; K. Peyton, supra note 23, at 37.
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or it could be authorized to function as a bank, as a depository institution,
itself.
The Comptroller of the Currency's rules for approving branch applications
by national banks have been liberalized to the point where these banks
could open branches in supermarkets or similar locations without legal
impediment.8 2 Whether this would make economic sense for banks is a
different question, however. Most banks feel they have enough branches
already, or indeed too many, as a by-product of interest rate regulation.
Moreover, much of the lifeline problem stems from the banks' economic
decision that they will not make money by aggressively or creatively pursuing
low-income markets.
Authorizing retailers to serve as depository institutions themselves, where
customers could open accounts for third-party payment and cash checks,
might be a more promising approach. Supermarket chains, for example,
already serve the low-income community. Their stores are generally located
to be convenient to consumers, rather than being concentrated in city centers
and thus absent from low-income neighborhoods, as banks are. To accom-
modate people's buying patterns, they are open long hours, including
evenings and weekends. In fact, they are more convenient than currency
exchanges because consumers go to them anyway, quite apart from any
need for payment services, and probably do so with the same or greater
frequency than they go to any payment provider. Thus, most people would
be able to use a transaction account at a supermarket without adding any
additional stops to their daily itineraries. If low-income consumers prefer
currency exchanges to banks because of rational considerations of conven-
ience, then supermarkets would provide an attractive alternative.
The same would be true if the preference for currency exchanges stems
from emotional sources. There is nothing intimidating about a supermarket.
While the lines may be as long as bank lines and the check-out clerks as
harried as the tellers, the fact remains that consumers, including low-income
consumers, regularly go to supermarkets. The apparently successful imple-
mentation of a major wealth transfer program-food stamps-through
supermarkets confirms their accessibility to low-income customers. Of course,
some consumers may find the management of a transaction account bur-
densome and prefer the more simple, if less convenient, process of cashing
checks and buying money orders. But supermarkets could offer these services
as well. They would have all the facilities needed to provide services identical
to the currency exchanges, and they would possess the additional ability to
offer a deposit account.
82. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.30(c)(1) (1991) ("[I]t is the general policy of the Office to approve
applications to establish and operate branches and seasonal agencies, provided that approval
would not violate the provisions of applicable federal or state law .... ).
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Current federal policy provides another reason for allowing retail chains
to offer accounts. The federal government is convinced that the most
efficient way for it to distribute benefits is by electronic transfer. It is
attempting to arrange the direct deposit of social security, veteran's benefits,
and other payments into the recipients' accounts, a process which it hopes
will lower costs and reduce losses from theft. 3 This requires an account of
some sort, and concern has been expressed about the practicality and
convenience of the government's approach for customers who lack accounts
of their own.84 By authorizing retailers to offer accounts, the number of
account holders would increase, and the process of electronic benefit transfer
could be greatly facilitated.
The ability of supermarkets and other retail chains to compete effectively
with currency exchanges would not necessarily lead to decreased prices.
Currency exchanges, after all, compete among themselves, even if they do
not compete with banks because they appeal to different markets. Unless
there is a market failure of some sort, the price currency exchanges charge
for various services should already be at the competitive level. To be sure,
the industry has developed a reputation for price gouging and has been the
subject of regulation in some states as a result of this perception.,5 But the
mechanism that would enable currency exchanges to charge noncompetitive
prices is unclear. The industry is not monopolized and, given its low cost
of entry, probably could not be. Information asymmetry is minimal; cus-
tomers are necessarily aware how much their checks are being discounted
and how much they are charged for money orders. Undoubtedly, there are
imperfections in this market as there are in any other: communities with
only one facility, occasional price-fixing agreements, or scattered predatory
practices. But there is little evidence of any systematic market failure within
the check-cashing industry.
Nonetheless, prices for payment services would probably be lower in
supermarkets than at the currency exchanges, not because of market failures
within the check-cashing business, but because transaction accounts are
more efficient than individualized check cashing and money order purchases.
The risk of fraud decreases when customers have ongoing relationships with
83. See FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FROM PAPER TO
PLASTIC: THE ELECTRONIC BENEFr TRANSFER REVOLUTION (1990).
84. See 1989 House Hearings, supra note 29, at 30-31 (statement of Jack Guildroy, Member,
Board of Directors, American Association of Retired Persons); 1989 Senate Hearings, supra
note 12, at 72 (remarks of Senator Dixon and William Douglas, Commissioner, The Financial
Management Service, Department of Treasury).
85. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-564 to -573 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53A.01 to .14 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 366-374
(McKinney 1990). On price gouging by currency exchanges, see supra text accompanying notes




the payment provider. To put this matter another way, the existence of an
account permits the provider to collect identifying information once, rather
than doing so each time the customer wants to cash a check. In addition,
third-party payments are less expensive with transaction accounts because
they can be processed in bulk. A money order requires an individualized
transaction, in which an employee collects the money and fills out the form.
Checks, by contrast, are filled out by the customer and processed by high-
speed machinery.a6
Finally, transaction accounts decrease the amount of cash that the pay-
ment provider must have available at any given time. Rather than cashing
an entire paycheck, the customer can deposit her check and withdraw the
amount she needs. Third-party payments require no cash on hand at all
since they are processed by debiting the account balance, whereas money
orders are generally bought for cash. Reducing the amount of cash on hand
decreases the risk of theft, by either outsiders or employees. More important,
cash does not earn interest, whereas account balances can be used for a
variety of income-earning purposes.
Aside from the greater efficiency of transaction accounts, retail chains
authorized to function as depository institutions would also be more efficient
than currency exchanges, due to various economies of scale. They could
operate depository services in their existing facilities instead of establishing
a separate physical location. This would not decrease the need for direct
customer service staff, like tellers, but it would permit combined use of
security, janitorial, secretarial, and supervisory employees. It would also
reduce the costs of construction, plant maintenance, and real estate taxes.
In a competitive environment-which should exist, given the number of
retail chains-these savings would be passed on to the consumer through
lower charges.
Another possible advantage is that retail chains might be willing to accept
lower profit margins on their payment services in exchange for increased
volume, and thus increased profits, in their primary business. The availability
of payment services would likely be a significant competitive advantage for
any retailer. This would be particularly true of supermarkets, which are the
stores to which people go most regularly and where many people, particularly
those in the low-income group, spend the largest proportion of their available
funds.87 Consequently, retailers might be willing to cross-subsidize payment
services, at least to a limited extent.8
86. A depository institution can also provide other services that low-income consumers
desire but cannot obtain from a currency exchange, such as savings accounts, safe-deposit
boxes, and cashier's checks. See 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 46 (statement of
Stephen Brobeck, Executive Director, Consumer Federation of America). Banks can provide
all these services, of course, but only if low-income customers are willing to use them.
87. W. NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 86 (1987).
88. These last two factors-economies of scale and cross-subsidies-could operate in reverse,
19921
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
The basic virtue of addressing the lifeline banking problem by authorizing
retail chains to provide payment services is that it would lead to the lowest
prices. The empirical question of whether banks or currency exchanges are
the lowest cost provider may be unresolved, but its resolution is not crucial;
there is reason to think that retail chains would provide these services more
cheaply than either of the existing providers. Moreover, even if this sup-
position is false, no harm would be done; deregulating, as opposed to
regulating further, does not entail any direct social costs. If retail chains
cannot offer cheaper payment services-if banks or currency exchanges are
really the optimal providers-the retailers simply will not enter the market,
or they will try to do so and abandon the attempt.
B. The Regulation of Risk as a Problem and Solution
For deposit accounts offered by retail chains to be viable options for
consumers, the consumers' deposits must be insured by the federal govern-
ment.8 9 Most consumers expect this and would be reluctant to place their
funds in any uninsured account. In the past, states would insure certain
accounts, but the failure of state insurance funds in Maryland and Ohio
has communicated the clear message that state-sponsored insurance funds
are unreliable.9 Certainly, if one wants to attract new customers, and if
these customers have stayed away, at least in part, because they are fearful
of banks, one would want to provide as many assurances as possible. This
means federal deposit insurance.
Deposit insurance, together with control of the money supply, is the
driving force behind the regulation of the financial services industry. When
a financial institution holds insured deposits, it is in effect holding public
funds since the insurance fund, and ultimately the government itself, is
responsible for any loss. As a result, the authority to accept insured deposits
is inevitably attended by public scrutiny over the level of risk that the
institution incurs.
While this adds complexity to the idea of authorizing retailers to offer
deposit accounts, it also creates some interesting possibilities. In our econ-
with retailers using payment service profits to lower prices on their primary product. Alter-
natively, retailers could raise prices because of the increased convenience of the service. In
either case, consumers would be getting something for their money-lower commodity prices
or increased convenience and an increased number of competitors. Other things being equal,
this would necessarily increase consumer welfare, regardless of the nature of the benefits.
89. Federal insurance is provided for by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No.
81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (1950), as heavily amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988)).
90. See 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 397-98; Miller, The Future of the Dual
Banking System, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 19 (1987).
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omy, risk translates rather directly into return; the greater the risk of a
particular investment, the higher the return it must offer. 9 When the
government assumes risk, therefore, it creates a powerful and flexible policy
instrument, because assuming part or all of a firm's risk is equivalent to
granting it a greater return.
The deposit insurance system has not fared well in recent years, and there
are now numerous proposals for the reform of the entire structure.9 2 These
proposals raise a range of complex issues which have no particular relevance
to payment services for low-income consumers, and they are consequently
beyond the scope of this discussion. For the moment, we can assume that
whatever scheme of deposit insurance and regulation applies to transaction
accounts at banks would also apply to those offered by retailers. Currently,
each firm that receives insured deposits pays a fee to the insurance fund,
computed as a percentage of its deposits.93 A federal agency, restructured
under recent legislation, administers the insurance funds and supervises
insured institutions.Y It has extensive powers; it cannot actually close an
institution, as state or federal chartering authorities can, but it has a nuclear
weapon of its own in its power to cancel the insurance, as well as a host
of lesser sanctions. 95
All of these regulatory rules could be applied to depository institutions
owned and operated by retail chains. 96 Two difficulties that might emerge,
91. See R. BREALEY & S. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 125-203 (1988); W.
SHARPE, Ii EsT ENTS 6-10 (1985); Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilib-
rium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).
92. See, e.g., Deposit Insurance Reform and Related Supervisory Issues: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
[hereinafter 1986 Senate Hearings]; Reform of the Nation's Banking and Financial Systems:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTUtRE TH BANKING
INDUSTRY (1982), reprinted in id. at 130; E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEosrr
INsURANCE (1985); Brooks, Insuring Confidence-Deposit Insurance Reform: A Conference, 5
ANN. REv. BANKING L. 111 (1986); Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors
to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129 (1986).
93. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1815, 1817 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989-1990). The fee is set by a formula that
has become more complex over time. It is computed against an assessment base that includes
uninsured deposits, id. § 1817(b)(2); thus, the law creates a subsidy from banks with high
proportions of uninsured deposits, generally money center banks, to banks with low proportions
of such deposits, that is, smaller commercial banks and thrifts. This is an example of the use
of deposit insurance as a subsidy mechanism. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 104-06
(proposal for another type of subsidy using deposit insurance).
94. The agency is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Under FIRREA, see
supra note 89, the FDIC supervises two funds: the first is the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF),
which continues the pre-FIRREA FDIC fund, and the second is the Savings Association
Insurance Fund, whose optimistic acronym is "SAIF," the successor of the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation, and thus the guarantor of deposits in a vast number of
unsafe, and indeed insolvent, institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1818.
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1818.
96. Presumably, these institutions would be subsidiaries of a larger company, rather than
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however, in regulating depository institutions owned and operated by re-
tailers are the riskiness of the firm and the multiplicity of the firms that
would require regulatory supervision. The horrible that comes to mind is
having depository institutions in thousands of tiny, economically unstable
retail firms like corner liquor stores or mom-and-pop :groceries. This problem
could be readily solved, however, by limiting the authorization to firms
with relatively high asset levels. For example, the minimum asset level could
be set as high as $500 million.97 Firms of this size are not likely to become
insolvent, unless there is a general economic disaster, and they would
constitute a delimited regulatory responsibility. Yet virtually all of them are
large chains, with widely distributed outlets. Collectively, they would reach
virtually every community in the country and could thus meet the needs of
low-income consumers for convenient banking services.
This might be contrasted with the situation in the existing financial services
industry. At present, there are over 14,000 commercial banks in the United
States and fully 35,000 institutions authorized to receive insured deposits.98
Some 300 of the commercial banks have less than $25 million in assets-
mom-and-pop banks, in effect." As we have learned from the savings and
loan crisis, they are small enough to be taken over by individual quick-
buck artists, compulsive gamblers, and outright criminals.1l° Large retail
chains are models of commercial responsibility by comparison.
Current legislation also regulates risk by limiting the types of investments
that can be made with these insured deposits. At present, banks, savings
and loans, and other depository institutions are limited by law to commercial
loans, real estate loans, money market funds, and other relatively low-risk
independent entities. But that is true of many existing depository institutions. Virtually all
large commercial banks are organized as holding companies that own a bank or a group of
banks as subsidiaries, as well as other subsidiaries, such as foreign banks, brokerage houses,
and financial c~nsultants, that fall under different regulatory regimes. See BOARD OF GOVEuORS
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYsTEM, THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978: A
CoMPENDIuM (1978); Mann, The Reality and Promise of Bank Holding Companies, 90 BANKING
L.J. 181 (1973); Shapiro, The One-Bank Holding Company Movement: An Overview, 86
BANKING L.J. 291 (1969). In December of 1989, the largest United States commercial bank
that was not controlled by a United States holding company ranked 24th in total assets out
of all commercial banks, and only eight of the top 100 were not controlled by United States
holding companies. AM. BANKER, Top NUMBERS: PART Two 18, 61 (1990) [hereinafter Top
NUMBERS]. Many of these were simply subsidiaries of foreign banks, such as Bank of Tokyo,
Sanwa Bank, and Industrial Bank of Japan. Id.
97. This would include all the firms on the 1991 Fortune list of America's 50 top retailers.
See FORTUNE, June 3, 1991, at 274-75.
98. See T. MAYER, J. DUESENRERRY & R. AUIBER, MONEY, BANKING AND THE ECONOMY
42-43, 71-76 (2d ed. 1984).
99. THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE-CHARTERED
BANKING 13, 237 (12th ed. 1988). Another 600 have under $50 million in assets.
100. See E. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? (1989); Atkinson,
Justice Says Long Arm of Law Reaching More S & L Cases, BANKING WK., Aug. 20, 1990,
at 2 (FBI had 404 cases pending against thrift institutions at the end of 1989).
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and appropriately "financial" activities. 0' There is no reason why retailers
need to follow the same rules as banks; they could be subject to either
stricter or more lenient regulations. This would allow further limitation of
the risk involved in authorizing retailers to offer deposit services, but it
also raises the possibility of subsidizing those services by permitting greater
risk.
If there are concerns that retail chains are less stable or less trustworthy
than banks, their use of deposited funds could be subjected to greater
restrictions than those applied to existing depository institutions. For ex-
ample, retailers could be required to invest these funds only in treasury
bills, state or municipal bonds, or qualified money market funds. 0 2 This
would virtually eliminate any risk to the insurance fund; treasury bills, for
example, are at least as reliable as federal deposit insurance because they
represent an equivalent obligation on the part of the United States Treasury.
Despite these restrictions, retailers could still operate payment services at a
profit. The interest rates on these investments exceed the market rates of
interest on transaction accounts, particularly since the market rate for a
low-balance account may be zero. However, any restriction on the amount
that retailers could earn from deposited funds would be reflected in pro-
portionately higher service charges to customers. At some point, these
charges would price retailers out of the market or, if consumers preferred
them as payment providers for emotional reasons, would impose costs that
would vitiate the purpose of allowing them to accept deposits in the first
place.
A preferable option is to permit retailers to use deposited funds for the
same purposes as existing depository institutions use them. They could then
make commercial loans, real estate loans, and consumer loans, in addition
to investing in financial instruments. Retailers could earn the same rate of
return as banks and could thus cut the costs of operating a depository
institution. Of course, many retailers would not want to establish a lending
operation, but there would be no need for them to do so. Given the highly
developed nature of American financial markets, it is easy enough to transfer
funds from the institution that generates them to one that can use them.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 115-29.
102. For a related proposal, see R. LrrAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKs Do? 164-89 (1987). Litan
proposes that deposit taking be separated from lending. Firms authorized to accept deposits,
he writes, "would be required to operate as (insured) money market mutual funds, accepting
deposits and investing only in highly liquid safe securities, or in practice, obligations of the
United States Treasury or other federally guaranteed instruments." Id. at 165. In Litan's
proposals, such firms, called "narrow banks," could be owned by holding companies that
also owned firms engaged in commercial lending and other financial activities. Id. But there
is no reason why these narrow banks could not be owned by commercial firms; the risk would
have been limited by the restrictions on the narrow bank's investments.
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The simplest example is the federal funds market, which enables regional
and local banks to "sell" their deposits to money center banks with more
extensive lending opportunities. 03
Still another possibility, and one that might be even more desirable on
social policy grounds, would be to impose fewer restrictions on certain
accounts than are currently imposed on banks. The most radical version of
this idea would be to impose no restrictions at all. In that case, the funds
could be used by the firm receiving them as an internal source of capital;
that is, for buying inventory, building facilities, or conducting day-to-day
operations. This would be highly advantageous for the firm, because con-
sumer deposits are a relatively inexpensive source of funds. Interest-bearing
transaction accounts, for example, generally pay four percent, whereas the
prime rate, which represents the cost of funds obtained from outside sources,
is currently 6.5%.104
The disadvantage of permitting any firm to use insured deposits as an
internal source of capital is the increased risk imposed on the insurance
fund, and ultimately on society at large. There would be no separate asset,
such as treasury bills or commercial loans, to secure the deposits; the firm's
ability to repay its customers would depend on its overall financial health.
In effect, a firm using insured funds as internal capital would be receiving
a subsidy from firms whose use of deposited funds remained restricted,
with the amount of the subsidy being determined by the firm-specific risk.
Moreover, the subsidy lacks the political accountability of a direct cash
payment; it does not require an appropriation when enacted but only on
that uncertain, undetermined day when disaster strikes. The current state
of the deposit insurance funds bears witness to this phenomenon.
But a subsidy that operates through the deposit insurance system would
have a number of advantages, despite its risks. In a competitive market,
the cost of the subsidy would be passed on to the depositors in the form
of either increased interest payments or decreased service charges. Thus, the
customers whose funds could be used in this way would be subsidized. This
is a much more efficient subsidy than legislating lower service costs; it
increases, rather than decreases, the firm's motivation to serve the subsidized
customers. Since eligible deposit funds would be an inexpensive source of
capital, firms would be motivated to increase the amount of these deposits.
This occurs because the subsidy is deregulatory in nature; it releases the
market rather than constraining it. Of course, it functions as a subsidy only
to the extent that the use of other deposited funds remains regulated; if all
deposited funds were deregulated, the differential would disappear. Since
103. See M. MAYER, Ti BANKERS 215-41 (1974); M. STIGUi, THE MoNEsY MARKEr: MYTH,
REA=ITY, AND PRACTICE 279-309 (1978).




that is unlikely to occur, however, the mechanism will remain a viable one
for the foreseeable future.
To subsidize low-income customers, therefore, the government need only
specify that deposits from such customers would be free of regulatory
restrictions and could be used by the firm receiving them for any purpose.
One could place the burden of proving eligibility on the depository insti-
tution, making the program relatively easy to administer. The institution
would be required to demonstrate that a deposit came from a member of
the beneficiary group before being allowed to use that deposit in an
unrestricted fashion. Of course, costs are costs, no matter who bears them,
and a complex eligibility requirement would still be more expensive than a
simpler one. At some point, the cost of proving eligibility might become
large enough to eliminate the subsidy and vitiate the program. That would
be an error in program design, but at least it would not create an additional
cost for the government's administrative structure.
Someone must pay for any subsidy, and the cost of this one would be
the increased risk resulting from the unrestricted use of insured deposits.
With proper eligibility rules for depositors, however, the risk could be
minimized. For example, anyone depositing more than a specified sum, say
$2000 per month, on a regular monthly basis could be deemed ineligible
for a subsidized account. The average daily balance on accounts of this size
would probably be at most $500, and that would be the extent of the risk.
Even if ten million such accounts were in effect, the government's total
exposure would be no greater than the exposure from the nation's seventy-
ninth largest commercial bank or its twenty-fourth largest thrift institution.05
In fact, the exposure is much less because the accounts would be widely
dispersed, and the institutions offering them presumably would not fail at
the same time, barring a financial catastrophe that would dwarf any concerns
about low-income consumers' accounts.
It should be noted that the idea of subsidizing low-income depositors by
removing the restrictions on the use of their funds is really separate from
105. See Top NUMBERS, supra note 96. As of December 31, 1989, the 79th largest commercial
bank, in terms of deposits, was Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis, with deposits of
$5,080,552,000. Id. at 11. Not all of this total is insured, of course, but the government has
revealed a tendency to pay off all depositors, whether insured or not, when there is a major
bank failure. See Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National
Bank: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions, Supervision, Regulation and
Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984).
The 24th largest thrift institution was People's Bank of Bridgeport, Connecticut, with
$5,576,000,000 of deposits as of December 31, 1989. See Top NUMBERS, supra note 96.
Ominously enough, no fewer than seven of the thrift institutions which had more deposits
than People's Bank had negative capital, and five of these were in the government's conser-
vatorship program; that is, they were insolvent. Id. Thus, the amount of additional risk from
as many as 10,000,000 lifeline accounts would not represent a significant increase.
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that of authorizing retailers to accept deposits. The latter idea is based on
the greater convenience and comfort of retail stores: it would lower costs
only because convenient, unintimidating payment services are currently
offered by high-cost, nondepository institutions. The subsidy would actually
lower any institution's cost of providing payment services. It could be made
available to banks that service eligible customers as well as to retailers and,
in fact, it should be, since many low-income consumers do use banks. But
it would be particularly effective when combined with the idea of authorizing
retailers to offer deposit accounts. By deregulating both the types of
institutions that can offer these accounts and the range of uses for insured
deposits, one could provide a truly effective system of lifeline banking for
low-income customers.
IV. CHANGING =H LEGAL FRAMEwoRK
Solving the payment problems of low-income consumers by permitting
retailers to offer deposit accounts would obviously require changes in existing
law. To articulate a complete solution, these changes should be specified.
Consideration of these changes will also serve to provide some insight into
the way one thinks about financial services, the reason why the industry is
structured as it is, and the implications of the proposed deregulation.
A. The Separation of Banking and Commerce
At present, the source of greatest controversy concerning the structure of
the financial, services industry is the Glass-Steagall Act.' °6 A product of
Franklin Roosevelt's first "Hundred Days,"'17 the Act is designed to increase
the stability of depository institutions by separating commercial and invest-
ment banking. The proposal to permit retailers to offer deposit accounts
implicates an important, related feature of our financial structure, the
separation of banking and commerce. Commerce, in this context, means
everything except financial services-everything from retailing to manufac-
turing to farming to filmmaking. A bank is not allowed to do any of these
things, and no company that does any of them is allowed to be, or own,
a bank.
The statute that most often comes to mind in connection with these
prohibitions is the Bank Holding Company Act of 19 5 6 .10s The purpose of
106. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 22, 48 Stat. 162 (1933)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 (1988)). These four sections of the larger Act that
separates commercial and investment banking are commonly referred to as "Glass-Steagall."
For an examination of Glass-Steagall and the reasons why it is controversial, see Glass-Steagall
Ought Not to Be a Privileged Sanctuary, Am. Banker, Aug. 16, 1982, at 4.
107. See W. LEUCHTENBURO, FR1ANrN D. ROOSmLT AND THE NEw DEAL 41-62 (1963).
108. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1849 (1988)).
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this Act was to "define bank holding companies, control their future
expansion, and require divestment of their nonbanking interests."'0 9 In other
words, the Act prohibits any firm from owning two subsidiaries, of which
one is a "bank" and the other is not. Should Sears Roebuck decide to buy
a bank, within the meaning of this Act, it would become a bank holding
company and would then be required to divest itself of its retail operations." 0
But the Bank Holding Company Act is not the basic prohibition against
the combination of banking and commerce. It does not affect banks
themselves; it only eliminates holding companies as a device for circum-
venting the underlying prohibition.' The real sources of the separation
between banking and commerce are the various chartering acts under which
American banks are constituted." 2 In this country's dual banking system,"'
each state has a chartering statute, and the federal government has its own,
the National Bank Act.' 14 These statutes establish the barrier between
banking and commerce through their definition of the term "bank."
The National Bank Act specifies the procedures for forming "[a]ssociations
for carrying on the business of banking""' and grants banks the power to
exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary""16 to do so. It
then specifies that "banking" may be conducted "by discounting and
negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences
of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing,
and circulating notes according to the provisions of [this chapter] .11 7 Most
state statutes contain similar definitions."' These chartering statutes establish
109. Id. at 133; see Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 48 (1981).
110. The Act does allow holding companies to acquire firms whose activities are perceived
as banking rather than commerce; the statutory language refers to activities "so closely related
to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8). Responsibility for administering the Act was assigned to the Federal Reserve
Board, and the Fed has promulgated a regulation, designated "Regulation Y," which specifies
these proper incidents. 12 C.F.R. § 225.21-.25 (1991). Known throughout the industry as the
"laundry list," this part of Regulation Y grants banks permission to lease personal or real
property, provide courier services for financial instruments, provide tax planning and prepa-
ration services, and so forth.
I11. Moreover, the Bank Holding Company Act posed a very limited legal impediment
before 1987, even, for holding companies, because it contained a major loophole. See infra
text accompanying notes 130-33.
112. See Halpert, The Separation of Banking and Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L.
481, 484-90 (1988).
113. On the dual banking system generally, see Butler & Macey, The Myth of Competition
in the Dual Banking System, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 677 (1988); Miller, supra note 90; Scott,
The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1977).
114. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1988).
115. Id. § 21.
116. Id. § 24.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 28-1-11-3 to -4 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. BANKING
LAw § 96 (McKinney 1990); Halpert, supra note 112, at 487-88.
19921
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
deposit taking as a core element of banking and require a bank charter to
engage in that activity. In order to receive that charter, the firm must be a
"bank" and must restrict itself to exercising the powers specified in the
statute." 9 If retailers are to be authorized to offer deposit accounts, these
federal and state provisions must be changed.
Beyond a change in the literal language of the chartering statutes, adoption
of the deregulatory approach to lifeline banking services also requires
rethinking the conceptual basis of regulation. This conceptual basis can best
be illustrated by considering judicial interpretations of the statutes. In
Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,20 South Shore National Bank bought a travel
bureau, relying on a prior ruling by the Comptroller that "national banks
may provide travel services for their customers and receive compensation
therefor.' 2' Forty-two independent travel agents sued South Shore and the
Comptroller. The district court found for the travel agents, holding the
Comptroller's ruling invalid and ordering the bank to divest itself of its
travel agency.'2 The court of appeals affirmed. It rejected the Comptroller's
argument that operating a travel agency is closely related to banking because
it involves "particular applications of the broad agency and informational
services which banks traditionally offer."'' In the court's view, the oper-
ation of a travel agency was "a highly complex activity,' 2 4 involving
representation of the carrier as well as the customer and including functions
regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, and the Federal Maritime Commission. The court said: "[There
is a difference between supplying customers with financial and informational
services helpful to their travel plans and developing a clientele which looks
to the bank not as a source of general financial advice and support but as
a travel management center."'
What is striking about this entire regulatory scheme, as reflected in
opinions such as Arnold Tours, is its conceptual segregation of banking
activities from other business endeavors. It is useful, for descriptive purposes
such as the Fortune 500 listing, to divide businesses into categories. In most
cases, however, these categories have no legal force; the government grants
the firm a corporate charter, thus constituting it as a legal entity, but does
119. See, e.g., sources cited in note 118.
120. 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972). Originally, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
dismissed the case on the basis that the plaintiff lacked standing, 428 F.2d 359 (Ist Cir. 1970),
but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 400 U.S. 45 (1970), in light of its decision in
Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
121. Arnold Tours, 472 F.2d at 429 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475 (1972)).
122. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 338 F. Supp. 721 (D. Mass. 1972).
123. Arnold Tours, 472 F.2d at 433. It also rejected the Comptroller's other argument,
which was that many banks had been providing travel agency services for a considerable period
of time. Id. at 434-35.
124. Id. at 433.
125. Id. The court did not specify the nature of that difference, however.
[V/ol. 67:213
LIFELINE BANKING
not specify its line of business. Studebaker can abandon automotive man-
ufacturing for other fields and Coca-Cola can enter the entertainment
business by acquiring Columbia Pictures without violating their respective
constitutive statutes. No one argues that Studebaker must limit itself to the
"business of automotive manufacture" or that filmmaking is not a "proper
incident to food and beverage production."
Of course, Studebaker and Coca-Cola are subject to a variety of antitrust,
environmental, securities, labor, and occupational safety regulations, but
these regulations were enacted for some fairly well-articulated social policy
purposes. Limitations on the activities of banks, particularly the Glass-
Steagall Act, are also often justified by reference to social policy, specifically
the policy of risk reduction. 126 But this justification is post hoc and unper-
suasive with respect to the definitions in the chartering statutes. These
statutes date back to the preregulatory era and make no reference to risk. 127
They simply codify the essence of a bank, as if any blurring of this
categorization would be an offense against nature. Contemporary interpre-
tations perpetuate this Aristotelian approach.'2
The Arnold Tours decision does not contain any analysis of the riskiness
of running a travel business. Had it done so, the outcome might have gone
the other way; operating a travel agency involves very little capital and is
probably much safer than making commercial loans. Instead, the decision
turns on the fact that a travel agency is not "banking" or an "incident"
of banking. The closest it comes to an explanation is the idea that the
essence of banking is financial matters, and the essence of a travel agency
is travel management. 29
In some sense, the lifeline banking proposal is a product of the same
conceptualism as the separation of banking and commerce. It takes the
existing structure of the banking industry as a given and attempts to aid
low-income consumers within the limitations of that structure. This leads,
126. See Comprehensive Reform in the Financial Services Industry: Hearings Before the
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 170-71 (1985) (statement
of Edwin B. Brooks, President, Security Federal Savings and Loan Association, Richmond,
Va.); id. at 648-49 (statement of James G. Cairns, Jr., President, Peoples National Bank of
Washington, Seattle, Wash.; President, American Bankers Association); Halpert, supra note
112, at 509-10. Another social policy that is often invoked is the danger posed by the power
of large institutions operating in many sectors of the economy. See id. at 500-07; L. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOP.ES' MONEY (1967). This second concern is often voiced about commercial banks-
probably a deep reverberation of American populism-but it is not often a concern about
supermarkets and other retail chains, which is the issue in this Article.
127. See supra note 118.
128. For incisive analysis of the risk argument, see Halpert, supra note 112, at 509-32;
Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88
COLuM. L. REv. 1153 (1988).
129. Arnold Tours, 472 F.2d at 433. Or as William Seidman, Chairman of the FDIC, put
the argument: "my view is that a bank is a bank is a bank." 1986 Senate Hearings, supra
note 92, at 252.
19921
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
almost ineluctably, to price regulation; if the product cannot be changed,
the only way to make it more accessible is to lower its price. The lifeline
proposal also partakes of the conceptualism endemic to the banking field
in a more general way. It treats "price" as a pre-existing entity, like
"bank"; if the price is too high, banks must be ordered to lower it. In
fact, price is not a thing in itself but the product of interacting market
forces. The effort to lower prices by direct ukase leaves those market forces
bubbling below the surface, where they will tend to undermine the entire
effort. To decrease prices effectively, one must act upon those market
forces, relying on social policy analysis rather than on pre-existing conceptual
categories.
B. Authorizing Retailers to Offer Depository Services
Given the conceptualism of the current banking statutes and of this
country's general approach to financial institutions, amending the chartering
statutes to eliminate existing prohibitions would probably be insufficient to
produce the desired result. Banking is a highly regulated industry, and the
regulatory agencies often regard the separate identity of their regulatees as
a matter of great importance. The result is a pervasively hostile atmosphere
for nonbanking firms that wish to expand into the banking business and
for banking firms that wish to expand beyond it.
One indication of this phenomenon is the "nonbank bank" experience.
Prior to 1987, the Bank Holding Company Act contained a major loophole;
it defined a bank as an institution that both takes deposits and makes
commercial loans. 130 Thus, a nonbanking firm could buy an institution that
was recognized by ordinary consumers as a bank, in that it possessed
checking and savings accounts, tellers' windows, ATM machines, Ionic
columns, snooty officers, and all the rest. The firm simply needed to avoid
using its funds for commercial loans, an activity quite remote from most
consumers in any case. Institutions of this nature, dubbed "nonbank banks,"
were established by several major firms, including Sears Roebuck and Merrill
Lynch.' The Federal Reserve Board, which administers the Bank Holding
Company Act, tried to prohibit this device, but the Supreme Court invali-
130. Bank Holding Company Act, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, § 1 (1956) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1988)).
131. See Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks-An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 Bus. LAW. 99
(1985); McIntyre, Note, The Nonbank Bank Loophole to the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956-The Need for Congressional Action, 37 ALA. L. REV. 713 (1986); Note, The Demise of
the Bank/Nonbank Distinction: An Argument for Deregulating the Activities of Bank Holding
Companies, 98 HARv. L. REV. 650 (1985) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
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dated the Fed's action.'3 2 Despite this apparent opportunity, the "nonbank
bank" was a limited and timidly used device; it served mainly as a means
of avoiding the geographic restrictions on banks but never really became
an instrument for the extensive merger of banking and commercial activi-
ties. 133
California's experience provides an even clearer illustration of the same
phenomenon. In California, where the chartering statute, perhaps inadver-
tently, has dispensed with any restrictions on the activities of banking
firms. 1 Despite this apparent latitude, California banks have not expanded
into unrelated fields, nor have nonbanking firms opened banks in California.
The State Banking Department, after all, retains the power to ban any
activity by a bank, no matter how closely related to banking, that threatens
the safety and soundness of the institution. 35 Banks fear, probably with
reason, that the Department would presume that nonbanking activities are
inherently unsafe;'3 6 nonbanking firms probably believe that the Department
would look askance upon their entry into the field. No firm is likely to
sink capital into an enterprise if the continued existence of that enterprise
will be held hostage by a hostile regulator.
Whether the boundary between banking and commerce should be elimi-
nated generally, in the interest of a more efficient financial services industry,
is a large question that has been debated elsewhere. 37 This Article asserts
that this boundary should be eliminated so that retailers can provide
inexpensive, convenient, and accommodating payment services to low-
income consumers. It is not sufficient to remove existing restrictions against
doing so; if retailers are to be induced to enter this new line of business,
the underlying conceptual structure of the industry must be altered. What
is needed is explicit statutory authorization. The National Bank Act or a
given state's chartering act must be amended to provide that retailers may
132. Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986). The Board had
promulgated a regulation that expanded the definition of both deposits and commercial loans
so that bank-like institutions that had slipped through the nonbank loophole would be subject
to the Act's restrictions. 49 Fed. Reg. 794 (1984). The Supreme Court took the position that
the Act meant exactly what it said.
133. See Felsenfeld, supra note 131, at 112-14. The loophole was closed by the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987), which changed the
definition of bank to include any institution that is federally insured or that accepts demand
deposits and makes commercial loans. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1988). Nonbank banks created
before March 5, 1987 were allowed to continue in existence. Id. § 1843(f)(2). See Wetmore,
Note, Banking and Commerce: Are They Different? Should They Be Separated?, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. Rav. 994 (1989).
134. CAL. Fn;. CODE § 101 (West 1989) ("All provisions of law applicable to corporations
generally.., shall apply to banks."); id. § 206 (Banks may engage in "any business activity.").
135. Id. § 430(b)(5).
136. Interim Report on A.B. 2521, Business Law Section, State Bar of California 82-85
(Sept. 25, 1989) (copy on file with Indiana Law Journal).
137. See Halpert, supra note 112; Harvard Note, supra note 131.
1992]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
establish depository institutions, and any amendment must establish a reg-
ulatory framework that specifically acknowledges the legitimacy of those
institutions.
Beyond this basic authorization, there are a variety of policy alternatives
to be confronted. The most crucial are whether retailers would be authorized
to offer all depository services or only transaction accounts and whether
they would offer these accounts to all customers or only to those eligible
for lifeline services. For the purpose of the discussion here, all that would
be necessary is the authority to offer transaction accounts to low-income
customers. The difficulty is that such a limited role might not be econom-
ically attractive to the retailer.
Granting broader powers to retailers, however, increases the potential risk
if these retailers prove less stable than banks and threatens to undermine
the existing stability of banks by increasing the competition for deposit
funds. While risk is the specter that haunts deregulation, much of the
concern about it is little more than a post hoc justification for the concep-
tually based structure of the financial services industry. There is no reason
to believe that the risk presented by retailer deposit accounts could not be
brought within acceptable limits. As stated above, the risk could be reduced
by imposing the same regulatory scheme on retailers and banks and by
requiring retailers to possess high minimum asset levels., 8
The effect of this proposal upon existing financial institutions is more
serious. Protecting a group of private businesses from market competition
is generally bad public policy. But financial institutions are hothouse plants;
they have been nurtured to their present condition by regulation, and
subjecting them to a cold blast of competition would be unwise and unfair.
The best course, therefore, would be to limit retailers to consumer
checking and savings accounts. Further limiting these accounts to checking
accounts only, or to low-income consumers, would probably be too restric-
tive. Once an institution has established the capacity to offer transaction
accounts, there are economies of scale in offering these accounts, together
with savings accounts, a9 to as many people as possible. If retailers were
restricted to a subset of their customers, they would probably be unable to
compete with banks. On the other hand, they could probably be limited to
consumer accounts generally, since obtaining and managing commercial
accounts is a separate enterprise unrelated to the retailer's customer base.
After determining the scope of a retailer's deposit-taking powers, the next
step would be to define the restrictions on its use of funds. This involves
both the range of business opportunities available to the retailer and the
138. See supra text accompanying notes 97-102.
139. Since deregulation, see supra note 11, the distinction between these two types of
accounts is relatively minor.
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amount of risk it is permitted to assume. The most obvious business
opportunity is consumer lending."'° The types of firms that can lend money
to consumers is not restricted at present, so permitting retailers to do so
with deposited funds would not subject banks to any added competition.
Retailers that offered deposit accounts would be a natural place for con-
sumers to borrow, and the advantages to both the retailer and the consumer
would warrant granting retailers specific authority to use deposited funds
for this purpose.
Restrictions on the use of deposited funds not only determine the business
opportunities of the firm, but also control the level of risk it incurs. As
discussed above, one way to subsidize transaction accounts for low-income
consumers is to permit the depository institution-whether bank or retailer-
to use insured funds without restriction. 141 The virtue of this approach is
administrative simplicity.1 42 Eligible accounts could be defined in terms of
a maximum average daily balance-$500 for example-plus a maximum
balance at any given time, perhaps $2000. The depository institution would
be permitted to use the average amount of funds in eligible accounts without
restriction. This amount could be readily calculated on a monthly basis by
a computer program and checked by the regulatory agency by means of the
same program. There would be no need to make individualized eligibility
determinations, nor would the institution need to impose additional charges
if the daily balance went above the established maximum. Rather, the
institution would know that particular sites, or particular fee levels, gener-
ated a certain amount of eligible, and thus unrestricted, deposits and would
adjust its policies accordingly.
Implementation of this program would require two further changes in the
banking laws. First, chartering statutes would need to define eligible accounts
and specifically authorize the institution to use these funds without restric-
tion. Second, the federal deposit insurance statutes would need to be
amended to ensure that this unrestricted use was explicitly authorized and
did not constitute an unsafe or unsound banking practice. As in the case
of the chartering statutes, no firm would invest its resources to establish a
depository institution catering to low-income customers if there were any
risk of a negative decision by the regulators.
The general conclusion, therefore, is that a program authorizing retailers
to provide transaction accounts and to subsidize the accounts of low-income
consumers, by removing restrictions on the institution's use of insured
deposits, requires a statute that explicitly authorizes all these features,
140. This is not really a risk-related question; consumer lending is generally a low-risk
business, and all insured institutions are currently permitted to engage in it.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
142. Other virtues of this approach, in terms of incentives to serve low-income customers,
have already been discussed. Supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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establishes unambiguous regulatory supervision, and clearly takes precedence
over any other statute. Whether even these rather extensive changes in the
law would be sufficient to induce nonbanking firms to enter the deposit
business must remain an open question. Given the conceptualism that
currently prevails in the field, however, it seems apparent that any ambiguity
or lack of explicit authority would preclude this solution to the problem of
providing low-cost payment services to low-income consumers.
CONCLUSION
The call for lifeline banking has been a persistent one over the last decade.
Underlying it is the brute fact that a large proportion of low-income families
are outside the American financial system. They possess neither checking
nor savings accounts and rely instead on cash, storefront check-cashing
outlets, and a variety of other mechanisms that seem to provide inferior
service.
Despite a respectable amount of empirical research on the matter, we still
do not know why so many families do not have bank accounts. Specifically,
we do not know whether they find banks too expensive, too inconvenient,
or too intimidating. Current lifeline banking proposals, which would require
banks to offer checking accounts at below-market rates, are premised on
the assumption that low-income people find banks too expensive. Even if
that assumption is correct-even if low-income people do not shun banks
because they are inconvenient or intimidating-the proposal is unlikely to
be effective. Forced to offer accounts at rates below those they want to
charge, banks will tend to close branches in inner-city neighborhoods or to
decrease the quality of service they provide. These are natural consequences
of price regulation, and they are difficult to counteract without massive
intervention.
This Article proposes an alternative approach for meeting the financial
needs of low-income consumers. It recommends expanding the services
available at the facilities they currently make use of, on the theory that it
is easier to follow their existing patterns of commercial activity rather than
try to establish new ones. Most people shop at grocery stores on a regular
basis, and many people cash checks there. These stores and other retail
chains could be authorized to offer insured deposit accounts. If one wants
to subsidize these accounts so that they are less expensive as well as more
convenient, one can do so by offering the retail chains positive inducements
to lower their prices, rather than by ordering them to do so. The most
powerful inducement would be to permit these chains-and banks as well-
to use the funds received from eligible depositors without restriction. This
would make deposits by low-income consumers the most attractive source
of funds, without significantly increasing the risk to the federal insurance
system.
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The solution proposed emerges from the economic analysis of law. It
speaks the language of markets and incentives, rather than coercion, and
treats the profit-maximizing behavior of financial institutions as a prevailing
condition, rather than a moral failure. This is not based on any judgment
that the market is either morally superior or intrinsic to human nature. It
simply acknowledges that market behavior is a powerful force at this time
and in this society. Our society has learned, from sad experience with many
other programs, that the luxury of using social policy to express appealing
moral sentiments is purchased at the price of effective results and ultimately
burdens those whom it is designed to benefit.

